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Abstract
This paper tries to understand why the Malay-speaking Muslims of southern-
Thailand1 are viewed as perpetual national security threats by looking at some 
deep-seated identity constructions that align Malay identity with violence 
and Thai identity with peace and patriotism. By insisting that southern Thai 
Malay-Muslims identify as Thai rather than as Malay, the Thai state and its 
Buddhist citizens view Malay Muslims' insistence on their Malay identity as 
not only a rejection of Thai-ness but also as a threat to the sovereignty of the 
Thai nation-state. By comparing the Thai Malays with the Thai Chinese, the 
most discriminated minority in the history of Thailand, the author argues that 
forging of economic links within and outside of Thailand has helped the Thai 
Chinese attain both political and economic success in Thailand while the pro-
motion of separatist identities such as Malay and Muslim have bequeathed the 
Thai Malays a legacy of violence. 
Keywords: Violence, southern Thai Malay-Muslims, human rights, ethnic/national 
identities, Thai Chinese
Introduction
In the rural Malay-Muslim-dominated society of southern Thailand, 
many negative stereotypes abound. Thai Buddhists, who are the nation's 
ethno-religious majority but form a minority in the Malay-Muslim-domi-
nated south, perceive Malay-Muslim men as lazy. Lazy because they sit 
around in the coffee shops drinking coffee or tea heavily sweetened with 
condensed milk, smoking their hand-rolled cigarettes and chatting with 
fellow villagers. However, such men are not sitting in the coffee shops 
just because they have nothing to do. They would have usually ﬁnished 
their daily jaunts to the sea, in the case of ﬁshermen, or to their rice, fruit 
or vegetable gardens in the case of farmers, and would then spend the 
rest of the day relaxing their tired bodies before beginning the routine 
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of their subsistence pursuits the following day. Since the house is often 
female space, Thai Malay-Muslim men spend their time relaxing in their 
favourite male domain spot, the coffee shop. Thai Buddhists however label 
men 'sitting around doing nothing' as lazy. Both Buddhist and Muslim 
informants tell me that Thai Buddhists, who work to accumulate wealth, 
see Muslims, who work to satisfy their subsistence needs on a daily basis, 
as lazy. To rural Muslims, acquiring wealth is contrary to their belief that 
Allah always provides for humans with his bountiful resources. To accu-
mulate something that will never grow scarce does not make sense in their 
world view, according to my Malay-Muslim informants of Pattani.
Parallel to this 'lazy Muslim' image is the much harsher 'violent 
Muslim' assessment. The Thai Malay-Muslim is deemed violent by the 
Thai Buddhist because he has, over the course of Thailand's history 
of colonizing the Malay-Muslim south, challenged the sovereignty of 
the Thai state to govern over him. In recent times, these two culturally 
ethnocentric Buddhist stereotypes of southern Thai Malay-Muslim 
men have been given opposite interpretations. While Muslims were 
seen as both 'lazy' and 'violent' in the past, the current unrest, which 
has labelled the Malay-Muslim south of Thailand the most violent area 
in Southeast Asia, has made Buddhists prefer the 'lazy' Malay Muslim 
to the 'violent' Malay Muslim.  At a time when some Malay Muslims 
are leading a violent insurgency in southern Thailand, Thai Buddhists 
seem to prefer 'lazy Muslim men' who sit around the coffee shop and 
do nothing. They are seen as not posing a threat to Thailand. They are 
considered safe Thai citizens who do not threaten Thai national security 
and territorial sovereignty. In such times of violence and bloodshed 
where blame is laid on Muslim men, those who are seen as 'lazy' are 
also seen as the best citizens since they are deemed to be innocuous, to 
be less threatening to Thai national security. 
In this paper, I explore the case of the Thai Malay-Muslims of southern 
Thailand as a people whose worth as Thai citizens hinges upon whether 
they pose a security threat to Thailand. At the present moment, the vio-
lence unleashed by some Thai Malay-Muslims has caused them to be 
viewed as security threats in the Thai national imagination. While the 
political turmoil in Thailand in the recent years has shown how Thai 
Buddhists have also resorted to violence, the violent Thai Malay-Muslim 
is often associated with being a threat to national security. While the 
current political crisis has destabilized the economy and government 
in Thailand, the predominantly Thai Buddhist protesters are not seen 
as national security threats in that they are not seen as threatening the 
_________________________________________________________________________63
_________________________________________ Peaceful Thai, Violent Malay(Muslim)
territorial integrity of Thailand. Southern Thai Malay-Muslims, who 
fought an insurgency in Thailand in the 1970s with the aim to separate 
and bring the Malay-dominated Muslim provinces under Malay-Mus-
lim rule, continue to be viewed as separatists threatening the physical 
borders of the Thai nation-state. Understanding how and why this view 
continues to dictate Thai perceptions of their Malay-Muslim citizens and 
therefore destroys any attempts to bring peace to the region is what this 
paper seeks to do. By providing a comparison with another minority 
group in Thailand, namely the Thai Chinese, this paper aims to show 
why the Thai Malay-Muslims have not been able to become an accepted 
part of the Thai citizenry. 
Why are Thai Muslims Viewed  
as National Security Threats? 
According to Thai media and ofﬁcial government reports, a violent insur-
gency was launched by Malay-speaking Muslim militants from the Mus-
lim-dominated southern Thai provinces of Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat 
in January 2004.2 More than 3,300 people, both Buddhists and Muslims, 
have died, several thousands have been injured, and schools, government 
buildings, nightclubs, Buddhist temples, railway stations, the airport in 
the major southern city of Hatyai, police stations and houses of private 
citizens have been torched or bombed. Drive-by shootings, killings using 
bombs, and beheadings are common methods of execution practiced by 
the aggressors who have included predominantly Muslim insurgents as 
well as members of the armed security forces who carry out retaliation 
killings. Why have some Malay-speaking Muslims of southern Thailand 
resorted to unleashing violence against the Thai state, which is governed 
by rules and principles often derived from Buddhism?
Before I answer that question, let me give a quick review of Muslims 
in Thailand.
Who are the Malay Muslims of Thailand?
Muslims in Thailand form the second largest ethnic minority after the 
Chinese. Numbering between four and six million in a population of 
about 62 million citizens and maintaining around 2,700 to 2,900 mosques, 
Muslims make up the largest religious minority in Theravada Buddhist 
Thailand (Scupin 1998: 229; Gilquin 2005).3
Thai Muslims comprise two broadly deﬁned categories.4 First, there 
are the Malay Muslims who speak the Malay language and reside pri-
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marily in the four southern Thailand provinces of Pattani, Yala, Satun 
and Narathiwat. Malay-speaking Muslims comprise more than 70 
percent of the total Muslim population in Thailand. The other category 
of Muslims is the Thai-speaking Muslims who reside in Central, North 
and Northeast Thailand (Scupin 1998; McCargo 2006: 3).
Although Muslims are a minority in Thailand, Malay Muslims of the 
south make up over 70 percent of the population in the four southern 
provinces. Most of the Malay Muslims in Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat 
speak several local varieties of the Malay language while many in Sa-
tun have begun using the local southern Thai dialect as their mother 
tongue. The present-day Thai provinces of Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat 
comprise an ancient Malay kingdom named Patani. 
The question of 'Malay' is a highly contested one in academic 
scholarship. Summing up these contradictions is a recent edited volume 
Contesting Malayness: Malay Identities across Boundaries (Barnard 2004). The 
authors in this volume refer to the nature of Malay-ness as 'one of the 
most challenging and confusing terms of Southeast Asia' (p. xiii). Since 
it is difﬁcult to pinpoint the precise meanings and origins of 'Malay', 
the authors say that we should focus at the level of everyday life where 
people in various parts of Southeast Asia explain Malay-ness as they live 
it. This very anthropological understanding of the term 'Malay' can be 
applied to southern Thailand as well where the provinces of Pattani, Yala, 
Narathiwat and Satun, as well as the three districts of Songkhla bordering 
the province of Pattani, are seen by the local Malay-speaking southern 
Thais as Malay-dominated areas. The inhabitants of this geographical-
cultural space are seen by both Thais and Malays alike as speaking various 
dialects of Malay, practicing Malay culture5 and espousing Islam.6 Though 
the Malay language is one of the principal markers of Malay identity in 
this region, Thai is increasingly spoken among the urban Malays. Yet, the 
Malay language is predominantly spoken amongst Malays themselves, 
especially in the rural areas of the four provinces. This self-perception 
of Malay-ness marked by language, cultural practices, religion and an 
important shared sense of history of being a people conquered by the 
Siamese (Thai Buddhist) powers has caused the Malays to see themselves 
as a distinct ethnic group vis-à-vis Thai Buddhists.
Historical works show that the kingdom of Patani was in existence in 
the region of southern Thailand since the sixth century when the king-
dom began sending diplomatic and trading missions to China (Teeuw 
and Wyatt 1970: 1).  Despite the fact that Patani is reputed as one of the 
cradles of Islam in Southeast Asia, the date for the Islamization of Patani 
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is unclear. And so are the facts on how and from where Islam came. 
However, since Islam was established in northern Malaysia by the late 
1300s, Teeuw and Wyatt say that Islam was probably established in 
Patani by that date as well (1970: 4). Whatever the date for the region's 
conversion to Islam, it became clear that Muslim traders were calling 
at its port since the sixteenth century. 
What is less clear though is its Malay history. As Barnard and Maier 
(2004: xiii) write, the question of 'Malay-ness' is 'one of the most challeng-
ing and confusing terms of Southeast Asia'. We see a similar confusion 
in the case of the Malays of southern Thailand as well. Although Patani 
(here referring to the 'Malay' kingdom of Pattani in southern Thailand) 
is often included when referring to the notion of 'Malay' (Barnard and 
Maier 2004: ix), translators of the Hikayat Patani (Patani Chronicles), 
historians Teeuw and Wyatt, record that the name Pattani came from a 
Patani princess who was so impressed with the bravery of a mousedeer 
that turned around and attacked the hunting dogs of the princess and 
then disappeared on the banks of the Pattani river that she spoke the 
following words, ma hai sia thii trong pata ning ('it disappeared on this 
beach'). This is a very interesting record since all the words spoken in 
this sentence are in Thai except for the last two words pata ning, which 
in the Pattani Malay dialect mean 'this beach'. Could this mean that the 
founders of the kingdom of Pattani were Thai-speaking Malays who, like 
their counterparts in the many villages of Songkhla and Satun, speak a 
mixture of Thai and Malay? Virginia Matheson (1979) writes in her article 
based on concepts of Malay ethos in indigenous Malay writings that there 
is no attempt in the court-based Hikayat Patani to 'present Patani as part 
of a wider (Malay) cultural or ethnic unity' (1979: 354). There seems to 
be only one reference to Melayu (Malay) in the Hikayat Patani and it refers 
to Johor. A Patani trader to Johor discovers that the tertib Melayu (correct 
Malay procedure) is different from the practices of Patani and asks the 
Johorians to teach him proper Malay adat or practices, which he equates 
with that of the kingdom of Johor in what is now southern Malaysia. 
What made Patani a Malay kingdom as classiﬁed by many authors and 
historians seems to be the Malay language as used in Thailand writing 
of the Hikayat Patani. If language is the only criterion used to categorize 
Patani as a Malay kingdom, then it is little wonder why contemporary 
Thai Malays use the Malay language as a strong marker of Thai Malay 
identity and Thai Malay exclusiveness. Patani was not a Malay kingdom 
in the sense of being part of the Malay cultural world except linguistically 
and Patanians had to learn from Johor its Malay customs. 
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The 'Violent' Malay(Muslim)
Beginning in 1786, these southern Malay-speaking provinces were 
'conquered' by the ﬁrst Siamese king of the current Chakri dynasty and 
subsequently absorbed gradually into the Thai polity. In the nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries these provinces were ofﬁcially incorporated into 
the Thai state as a result of treaties made between the Thai government 
and the British colonial government in then Malaya. The status of these 
provinces changed from independent states that paid tribute to their 
overlord at various times since the thirteenth century in return for protec-
tion against molestation by powerful rivals to being under more direct 
rule of the Siamese polity. Siamese administrators were dispatched to 
these Malay-Muslim provinces to rule according to Siamese law while 
the Malay-Muslim rulers were left to adjudicate over religious matters. 
The most important sign that the Malay rulers had lost ruling power over 
their Malay subjects was when the Siamese administrators took over 
the task of collecting taxes from the local people. Previously, the Malay-
Muslim rulers performed this role and used part of the taxes collected 
to pay the tribute to their overlord. Now they were totally absolved of 
this role and in a sense lost direct control over their subjects. 
As the three provinces came more under the inﬂuence of the Siamese 
government, there were several rebellions against Siamese rule by the 
local elites. These were successfully contained by the Siamese forces 
but the periodic rebellions continued. While they often lasted for short 
periods of time and were quickly put down, the rebellions have grown 
more violent since the late 1960s as a result of the Thai government's 
forced assimilation and sometimes highly racist and ethnic chauvinistic 
policies that undermined Malay-Muslim culture, language and identity. 
An organized separatist movement consisting of several groups began 
what became the longest running insurgency in the history of Thailand. 
During the 1960s and 1970s periodic bombings of police and military 
installations, torching of schools and government ofﬁces were mounted 
by various separatist factions to resist repressive Thai policies (Scupin 
2005). Finding that military responses were not effective in stemming 
this violence, the Thai government developed more tentative pluralistic 
policies that were aimed at integrating the Malay-Muslim provinces. By 
the late 1980s, the irredentist violence subsided and the Malay-Muslim 
communities became actively involved in civil political institutions in 
Thailand. However, periodic outbreaks of violent activities still festered 
in the Muslim south as a stark reminder of the presence of unsatisfactory 
elements within the southern Malay-Muslim population. 
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This periodic violence took a new turn in January 2004 when Malay-
Muslim insurgents raided a military camp in Narathiwat, stole over 
400 weapons and killed four Buddhist soldiers after separating them 
from the Muslim ones.7 This daring attack on a military post, seen as a 
symbol of law and order in the Muslim south, was seen as an affront to 
the state. The government of then Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra 
took swift military action against the Malay-Muslim population in the 
south. However, the violence and killings only increased and to date 
more than 3,300 people have died, schools, Buddhist temples, govern-
ment buildings and nightclubs have been torched or bombed and many 
Buddhists have moved out of the region for fear of attacks on them by 
Malay-Muslim insurgents. Malay Muslims, too, have undergone pain, 
loss and psychological trauma where they have been forced by both se-
curity forces as well as the military to provide support and information 
regarding the perceived enemies. Relationships of trust and friendship 
between Buddhists and Muslims have broken down. Malay Muslims, 
too, have had their families and lives torn apart in cases where family 
members have been killed or injured or where families found themselves 
in conﬂict because of differences in loyalties among the different family 
members. Currently, the south of Thailand is the most violent region in 
Southeast Asia and Malay Muslims here have suffered the most, labelled 
as violent, fanatics, separatists and terrorists.
The 'Peaceful Thai'
At present, the general Muslim population in the south of Thailand 
is no longer viewed as comprising lawful Thai citizens but instead as 
containing elements that are threats to national security. We have seen 
how the image of the 'violent Malay Muslim' has been constructed 
in the Thai national imagination as a result of the incessant wars that 
the Malay-speaking Muslims of the south fought against what they 
perceived as the unjust and discriminatory rule of the Thai-Buddhist 
government whose political legitimacy was often compared to that of a 
neo-colonialist power. The socially constructed 'violent Malay Muslim' 
image in Thailand is in contradistinction to another socially constructed 
image, that of the 'peaceful Thai'.
Let us investigate the process of this social construction.
In the history of western colonial excursion into Southeast Asia, 
Thailand stands out as the only country in the region that successfully 
resisted colonization by the six major western colonial powers that oc-
cupied Southeast Asia, namely, the Portuguese, French, British, Spanish, 
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Dutch and American. This non-colonized status is a great source of pride 
for Thais and is exempliﬁed in the name of the country, Thailand. Once 
the absolute monarchy was overthrown and a constitutional monar-
chy set up in its place in 1932 with forms of government ranging from 
military dictatorship to electoral democracy, the name of the country 
changed from Siam to Thailand in 1939.8 The government's decision to 
change the name of the country has been discussed by two historians 
in their recent works. Terwiel argues the name change was 'part of 
a campaign to foster values that would be recognized as cultured in 
the international world' while Wyatt says that the name change was 
intended to signify 'the country belonged to the Thai as opposed to the 
economically dominant Chinese' (Barme 1992: 147).
There are essentially two meanings to the word Thailand. 
1. 'Land of the free' where the word thai is the word for 'free'.9
2. 'Land of the Thai people' 
a. where Thai is essentially an ethnic group, Tai, whose con- 
stituents occupy land that stretches from southern China to 
mainland Southeast Asia;10 
b. Thai as citizens of Thailand. 
Though it appears that the two meanings bear little relationship to 
one another, in fact, they are closely linked. The Thais (by ethnicity and 
nationality) are a free people because they have never been colonized by 
a foreign imperial power. Those who are Thai by ethnicity or nationality 
are testimony to the freedom from colonization of the Thai nation-state. 
Ethnicity and nationality are intrinsically tied to freedom; ethnicity and 
nationality are intrinsically tied to the Thai nation-state. So, Thai people 
can never threaten the peace and security of the Thai nation. But one 
group in Thailand has, and continues to threaten Thai national security 
and territorial sovereignty. This is the Malay Muslim, the violent Malay 
Muslim who wants to break up the territory of Thailand. He is not Thai 
by ethnicity and refuses to be Thai by nationality.
Thai Malays and the Thai Nation
As a Malay-speaking11 Muslim, the Thai Malay can never be consid-
ered an ethnic Thai where the latter is identiﬁed as speaking a Tai 
language (commonly found in mainland Southeast Asia including 
Thailand, Burma, Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam) and is a Buddhist. 
This ethnic-religious-linguistic identiﬁcation complex is often a char-
acteristic of group identiﬁcation in Southeast Asia.12 However, within 
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this ethnic-religious-linguistic kaleidoscope of Southeast Asia, another 
marker of identity, often for the purposes of creating a nation-state, is 
nationality. 
 In Thailand, the process of nation-building was a little different from 
the rest of Southeast Asia. As mentioned earlier, Thailand was never 
colonized. What became its geo-body (Thongchai 1994) or political-ter-
ritorial boundaries were formed as a result of forced treaty enactments 
with European governments (especially French and British) and the 
United States (Vandergeest 1993: 139). Thailand, therefore, inherited 
a motley crew of different ethnicities including Mon, Karen, Burmese, 
Khmer (Cambodian), Vietnamese, Lao and Malay within its borders. 
The peoples belonging to these different ethnic groups, with rela-
tives living across the border from them in Thailand, were brought 
together into the Thai nation-state as a result of anti-colonial struggles 
in Thailand’s neighbouring countries. They were brought into the 
Thai national fold as a result of the anti-colonial movements outside 
of Thailand that resulted in the colonial powers seeking to strengthen 
their own legitimacy to rule in Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and Malaysia 
by more strongly deﬁning and policing national borders. And because 
the different ethnic groups in Thailand did not have a shared history 
of ﬁghting western colonial powers, other means were necessary to 
integrate them into Thai society. This integration was seen in the aim 
of the Thai state to give all citizens a common identity—a Thai identity. 
Because of the constructed link between Thai identity and national 
pride and loyalty, all efforts were made to convert the various ethnic 
groups in Thailand into embracing a common Thai identity. Such Thai-
icizing efforts have ranged from austere policies of assimilation to less 
drastic integration and more ﬂexible approaches of deﬁning Thai-ness 
through civil society.
And deﬁning Thai-ness has been a most important aspect of identiﬁ-
cation with the Thai nation. In his brilliant book Siam Mapped: A History 
of the Geo-body of a Nation (1994), Thai historian Thongchai Winichakul 
writes that the construction of national identity is often done in opposi-
tion to what it is not. The discourse of the modern nation-state usually 
presupposes a two-way identiﬁcation: 'positive by some common na-
ture, identity or interests; negatively by differences with other nations' 
(Thongchai 1994: 3). 'Positive' ways of deﬁning Thai-ness have included 
the monarchy and Buddhism as the most important elements of the na-
tion, love of national independence (free from colonization), tolerance 
and compromise or assimilation to civilized Thai culture (Thongchai 
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1994: 4). While there is never a clear deﬁnition of what Thai-ness entails, 
Thais are often better able to identify what is un-Thai, thus deﬁning the 
domain of Thai-ness from the outside (ibid.). Often, reference to un-Thai-
ness is done by creating an Other. One such un-Thai Other is codiﬁed in 
the term khaek. This term covers the peoples and countries of the Malay 
peninsula, the East Indies, South Asia and the Middle East without any 
distinction. Khaek also denotes Muslim (Thongchai 1994: 5). 
So we can see how, in deﬁning Thai-ness, an unclear category, one 
side result is the creation of the Malay Muslims as un-Thai.
And in the recent upsurge of violence in the south of Thailand, the 
Malay Muslim has become even more un-Thai by challenging the integ-
rity of Thailand's borders and threatening national security. This threat 
to the state is the single most aggressive challenge that southern Thai 
Malay-Muslims have issued to the sovereign Thai nation-state.
This threat issued by some Malay Muslims to the Thai state has 
caused a counter-reaction from the Thai security forces, which has 
unfortunately only alienated the Malay-Muslim community and even 
converted some Muslims to militancy (McCargo 2008). The perceived 
lack of cooperation from the Malay Muslims, the breakdown of intel-
ligence in the region and the involvement of even women and children 
in some of the blockades and demonstrations13 have unfortunately led 
the Thai security forces to at times ignore basic human rights values 
and launch all-out assaults against the southern Thai Malay-Muslims. 
However, such abuses of human rights by state agents are often justi-
ﬁed by prevailing images in the society that serve to paint the victims as 
national security threats. Below, I review the situation of human rights 
abuses in southern Thailand.
Violence, Human Rights  
and the Southern Thai Malay-Muslim 
The crisis of the contemporary state springs from its differentially suc-
cessful monopolization of power and the contradiction between it and 
the demands of peripheralized people(s) who through resistance have 
created new subject positions that challenge fundamentally the deﬁni-
tions of who and what ought to be repressed (Nagengast 1994: 109).
In her review essay on the anthropology of violence and the state, 
Carole Nagengast (1994: 111) writes that the state, by virtue of its mo-
nopoly over violence (cf. Weber), reads any opposition from its citi-
zens as violence against it. The remedy for this is often oppression or 
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state-sponsored violence or terror. In fact, the state is often 'the greatest 
instigator of cycles of violent human rights abuses as it seeks to sup-
press change and prevent opposition movements from undermining 
its legitimacy' (Nagengast 1994: 115). That is because the state has the 
express intention of realizing certain social, ethnic, economic and politi-
cal goals in the realm of public affairs (Nagengast 1994: 114). Because of 
this express objective, political violence is tolerated and justiﬁed by the 
state as acts of preserving the sanctity and stability of the state and the 
nation. However, state leaders everywhere claim respect for universal 
human rights and deny that their acts constitute torture, violence or 
terror, instead preferring to characterize them as necessary measures 
to insure order and respect for the law (Nagengast 1994: 115).
In the case of southern Thailand, we see a similar situation. The Thai 
Malay-Muslims have been the only group to constantly challenge the 
legitimacy of the rule of the Thai state over the Malay-Muslim south 
ever since this area was conquered by the Thai-Buddhist monarchy over 
two hundred years ago. When the Thai government tried to assimilate 
all minority groups in Thailand in the belief that sharing a common 
identity would give them a heightened sense of belonging to the Thai 
nation-state, which by extension would remove any threat that they 
could pose to the Thai state, its assimilation efforts were violently chal-
lenged by only one group—the Malay Muslims. One reason is because 
the Thai policy of integration sought to sever the link between Islam 
(religion) and Malay-ness (ethnicity) (Christie 1996: 186). In its purest 
form, the Thai policy has been aimed at the creation of a Thai-speaking 
population that uses Arabic in the mosques and in the pursuit of Islamic 
studies, with Malay withering away as a quaint local dialect. In addition, 
attempts have been made to translate the key religious texts into Thai, 
and even gradually to Thai-icize Malay by using the Thai script for the 
Malay language (Christie 1996: 186-87).
The Thai government has sought to integrate the whole Islamic 
identity from the school right down to the mosque level. Some of their 
political programs for assimilation shared ideological characteristics 
with other 'national revolutions' at that time. For example, the ultra-
nationalist government of Prime Minister Phibunsongkhram who 
came into power in 1938 sought to create a single Thai nation-state 
that included a modernization program designed to break down 
backward customs and uniformity in language and social behaviour. 
This political program was very similar to national revolutions around 
the world at that time such as that of Kemal Ataturk of Turkey. Like 
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Ataturk's reforms in Turkey, Phibunsongkram's 'Royal Decree pre-
scribing customs for the Thai people' of 1941 contained elements of 
westernization—cutlery to replace customary methods of eating with 
ﬁngers; western-style hats, trousers, and dresses to replace traditional 
clothing and a prohibition on betel-chewing—along with an emphasis 
on national pride and unity. In Muslim areas, for example, the Friday 
holiday was banned and steps were begun to phase out Muslim law. 
Muslims saw this as a threat to their ethnic and religious identity and 
there could be no clearer justiﬁcation for a new jihad. It was about this 
time that the modern Pattani separatist and irredentist movements 
began (Christie 1996: 176-77).
The state therefore incorporates cultural and political forms, represen-
tations, discourse, practices, and activities and speciﬁc technologies and 
organizations of power that taken together help to deﬁne public interest, 
establish meaning and deﬁne and naturalize available social identities 
(Nagengast 1994: 116). However, these often static and unitary forms of 
representations and discourse locate absolute power in the state. Citi-
zens who ﬁnd themselves victimized by these unitary representations 
struggle against the state to seek legitimacy for practicing and retaining 
their own representations. In the ensuing struggle, human rights are not 
only violated but such violation is justiﬁed as not violation at all. One 
such way is through the creation of certain myths. One such myth that 
characterizes the modern rational nation-state is that 'it is unthinkable 
…that a state would typically and openly exercise its power, through 
violence, even torture and terrorism' (Nagengast 1994: 120). Hence all 
violence exercised by the state is legitimated by ﬁtting into existing, 
acceptable discourses: patriotism, retaliation for real or imagined past 
injustices, separatism, terrorism, communism, subversion, anarchy, 
the need to preserve the state's territorial integrity, the need to protect 
the nation from subversion through ethnic cleansing, the ﬁght against 
crime, the war on drugs (ibid.).
Many states use such rhetoric to justify their suppression of groups 
ﬁghting against them. During the dirty war in Argentina, one general 
is reported to have said, 'Democracy must be protected for wrong 
ideas spread like cancer if they are not excised' (Nagengast 1994: 121). 
A Turkish prison ofﬁcial who tortured Kurdish prisoners referred to 
the Kurdish movement for independence by saying that 'communism 
is against the law here, so is separatism' (ibid.).
Thailand has used similar rhetoric by calling the Malay-Muslim in-
surgents 'terrorists', 'murderers', 'wayward, jobless youths', 'unpatriotic', 
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'separatists', etc. By highlighting the intent and actions of the insurgents, 
which have included destruction of lives of Thai citizens and public 
property, the Thai government, especially under the former Prime Min-
ister Thaksin Shinawatra, had often justiﬁed their high-handed acts of 
violence and terror against suspected Malay-Muslim militants.
If human rights abuse by the state is justiﬁed as not abuse, then can 
people like Thai Malay-Muslims clamouring for possible separate 
statehood call their right to self-determination a human right? Thai 
Malay-Muslims, like many subordinate groups challenging the power 
of rule of the state over them, are historical victims of an internal colo-
nization as well as victims of the way a colonial power (the British) 
carved up the Thai-Malaysian border. Their claim to self-rule is based 
on the prejudice and injustice that they have suffered under Thai rule, 
as well as their claim to rights to practice and retain their language and 
culture. On the part of the state, its attempt to absorb these subalterns 
through assimilation or acculturation has resulted in violent episodes 
of oppression and even ethnocide. It is important to note that since 
1945, state-sponsored violence towards ethnic and political groups has 
resulted in more deaths, injuries and general human suffering than all 
other forms of deadly conﬂicts including international wars and colonial 
and civil wars (Stavenhagen 1990 in Nagengast 1994: 126). If so, can this 
not be called blatant violation of human rights? 
If we look at the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), 
Article One in the two added covenants to the UDHR states:
All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right, they 
freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social 
and cultural development.
In her analysis of this statement, Nagengast (1994: 126) argues how the 
interpretation of this statement has been problematic because the deﬁni-
tion of peoples is 'both contested and confused with other categories such 
as minorities.' Minorities do not have a right to self-determination, peoples 
do. And the peoples who have successfully claimed self-determination are 
those who were colonized by a colonial power like the colonized nations 
of Africa or recently occupied as in the case of East Timor in Indonesia. 
Minorities are often told to ﬁnd justice within their own borders (Na-
gengast 1994: 127). Hence it is often left to states to deﬁne what a people 
means and the UN message is that states should avoid interfering in the 
sovereign decision of other states as to what constitutes a people (Nagen-
gast 1994: 128). Thus, groups of people seeking self-determination within 
individual nation-states have much stacked against them.
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The Thai Chinese and Thai Malay: A Comparison 
According to Canadian sociologist Peter Vandergeest, most modern soci-
eties are governed by the closely linked twin traditions of regulation and 
universalistic rights. Thailand, as a good example, reveals how increasing 
state regulation of society produced struggles based on universalistic or 
individual rights. Both these phenomena were institutionalized under 
the auspices of the nation-state through citizenship with the intention 
of effective rule (Vandergeest 1993: 133). However, citizenship did not 
fail to exclude non-national differences that people embodied, including 
class, gender, ethnicity, kin and/or factions. In fact, it created a space for 
subaltern action in counter- or anti-hegemonic practices as Scott (1985, 
1990) so clearly shows to be the case among peasants generally. 
In the case of Thailand, Vandergeest (1993) argues that the Thai state's 
adoption of a western colonial model of government as a way to pre-
empt western colonial incursion (Thailand remained the only country in 
Southeast Asia that was not colonized by a western power) undermined 
the old system of authority. The new system of governance, which was 
adopted after Thailand became a democratic nation-state in 1939, was 
not able to offer a new basis of legitimate authority. Villagers' rejection of 
the ofﬁcials' leadership forced the ofﬁcials to use coercion and violence 
to implement their policies. This contributed to the growth of organized 
resistance in the country by the 1970s, including the longest-running 
insurgency in the Muslim south, which has received much support from 
the peasantry (Vandergeest 1993: 150).
The Thai state's attempt to create Thais out of the different ethnicities in 
the country saw many policies of national integration attempted by many 
Thai heads of state. One common theme in all these policies was the fact 
that the relationship between peoples within the boundaries of the Thai 
state had to be based on sharing a common heritage from the past. Two 
important criteria were the Thai language and Buddhist religion. All peo-
ples speaking varieties of the Thai language and espousing the Buddhist 
faith were considered members of the Thai nation (Keyes 2002: 1179). It is 
easy to see how such prescription to being Thai excluded several groups, 
but most signiﬁcantly the Malay-speaking Muslim of southern Thailand. 
Inherent in the project of nation-state making was the exclusion of the 
Malay-speaking Muslim peoples of southern Thailand.  
Were the Thai Malays the only ones to be excluded from the nation 
making process in Thailand? Were other ethnic groups subject to similar 
abuses as well?
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Thai Chinese are seen as the people who have been subjected to 
the most racist assimilationist policies practiced by successive Thai 
governments. While the Thai Malays have at least been considered an 
indigenous group of Thailand, the Chinese were considered foreigners 
right up till the end of Chinese migration into Thailand in the late 1930s. 
While other indigenous peoples including Thai Malays were sometimes 
subject to policies of national integration, the Chinese have consistently 
been subject to policies of assimilation (nayobai phasom klom klun) (Keyes 
2002: 1179-80). Chinese schools were shut down or forced to incorporate 
the regular curriculum of Thai national schools (Chan and Tong 1993: 
154). Chinese were forced to give up their names and adopt Thai names 
instead (Kasian 1997). Yet, the Chinese are today what Craig Reynolds 
calls a semi-assimilated people (1998: 121). How so?
The ethnic Chinese are the biggest minority in Thailand constituting 
about 12 percent of the Thai population. They are concentrated mainly 
in Bangkok and in the provincial capitals as well as in the local markets 
throughout the kingdom (Phuwadol 1991: 119). Chinese-Thai relations 
go all the way back to the Sui Dynasty (ca. 600 AD) when a Chinese 
princess married a Siamese royal prince and left for Siam accompanied 
by 500 ceramists and other craftsmen (Gambe 2000: 99). Siam had always 
maintained a subordinate status in its relationship to China, either as a 
vassal or tributary state (ibid.). Chinese merchants became prosperous 
and increased in numbers during the Ayuthaya period (1350-1767) in 
Thai history. Their conduct of business was early on achieved by creating 
trade relations with the Thai monarchs through royal trade monopolies, 
which were established in 1629. These mutually beneﬁcial economic 
partnerships, where the Thai disinclination for distant seafaring and 
demand for foreign trade was fulﬁlled through the Chinese, led to the 
favourable economic position of the Chinese. Considered outcasts by 
their home governments, the Chinese looked to Thai royal patronage for 
security and protection. They became tax collectors, maritime ofﬁcials 
and provincial governors, were conferred Thai titles of nobility and 
intermarried extensively with the Thais (Phuwadol 1991: 120). 
The Chinese relationship with the Thai was more ﬁrmly established 
when Chao Tak Sin, born of a Chinese Teochiu father and Siamese 
mother, became king in 1767. The Burmese had defeated the Thai and 
completely destroyed the old capital of Ayuthia in that year. Tak Sin thus 
became a hero of Siamese independence when he defeated the Burmese 
and restored the glory of Thailand. Under Tak Sin's rule, the Teochius 
migrated in large numbers to Thailand. Tak Sin was deposed by Rama 
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I, his son-in-law, a half-Chinese and founder of the present Chakri dy-
nasty. During the rule of Rama I and his successors, Chinese immigration 
continued and the Chinese ﬂourished (Phuwadol 1991: 120). 
Despite their famed success in Thai society, Hamilton and Waters 
(1997) caution against a static and a historically continuous account of 
Chinese entrepreneurship. According to these two sociologists, it was 
the ability of the Chinese to be ﬂexible, to adapt their businesses to 
strikingly different contexts that led to their success (1997: 260). They 
show how the Chinese effectively reconstituted themselves in ways 
that enabled them to function during three signiﬁcant periods in Thai 
history. The ﬁrst period, the authors label as patrimonial rulership 
(1997: 262). This period began with the reign of Rama I, founder of the 
current Chakri dynasty. When the Chakri kings, with the intention of 
increasing their wealth and position, encouraged Chinese migration, 
Bangkok became a predominantly Chinese city. Chinese became court 
ofﬁcials and administrators and intermarried with members of the Thai 
royal household. The Chinese were also favoured because they helped 
expand the royal trade monopoly. The Chinese held state monopolies in 
opium, gambling, lottery and alcohol. The Thai 'merchant-kings' were 
thus dependent on Chinese commercial, ﬁnancial and maritime skills 
(Gambe 2000: 100).  This intimate Thai-Chinese relationship was trans-
formed with the Bowring Treaty in 1855. Essentially, the treaty drawn 
up by the British forced Siam to open its doors to foreign trade. In order 
to avoid being colonized by western powers who had occupied every 
country in Southeast Asia in the name of free trade, Siam maintained its 
independence by allowing westerners and western modernizing prac-
tices in Thailand (Hamilton and Waters 1997: 263). Western merchants 
established trading houses in Bangkok and Thailand's economy was 
opened to international inﬂuences. Western incursion into Thailand 
offered increased economic opportunities and the Chinese now began 
to shift their loyalties to western traders, increasingly becoming com-
pradors for western trading houses (Hamilton and Waters 1997: 264). 
They concentrated on the export of teak, rice and tin. 
By the 1890s, the income of the royal household had fallen. In order 
to create new wealth, the Chakri kings used Chinese capital, labour and 
expertise to establish monopoly over capitalist enterprises. This led to the 
building of infrastructure over which the royal household had effective 
control and partial ownership. However, the Chinese were no longer 
dependents of the kings. Instead they became competitors. This was the 
time where the Chinese became ethnic strangers instead of privileged 
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insiders (Hamilton and Waters 1997: 265). The hostility towards the 
Chinese was seen in King Rama VI's label for the Chinese as 'Jews of the 
East' (ibid.). Thai xenophobia against the Chinese culminated in 1932 
when a nationalist military regime came to power in a bloodless coup 
(Hamilton and Waters 1997: 269). The new government changed to an 
import-substitution strategy of business that turned whole sectors of the 
economy into political beneﬁces. The emphasis on self-sufﬁciency and 
the corresponding decline in international trade as a result of the end 
of colonial rule in most parts of Southeast Asia changed the status of 
economic growth in Thailand. Government ministries began to develop 
their own state-owned enterprises. The key Chinese businessmen of 
this era were mostly small businessmen who served as brokers between 
the Chinese minority and Thai elite. The new government policy that 
isolated the Chinese essentially created a 'pariah entrepreneurial class' 
(Hamilton and Waters 1997: 270). 
This discriminated status of the Thai Chinese changed by the 1970s 
and 1980s when Thailand's economy changed from an import-substitu-
tion to an export-oriented economy. The newly industrializing Asian 
countries such as South Korea, Hong Kong, Taiwan and Singapore 
becoming aggressively export-oriented and creating an economic sea 
change that engulfed the entire region facilitated this. The internation-
alization and industrialization of the Thai economy created a new group 
of Thai-born entrepreneurs who not only formed joint ventures with 
Japanese and American ﬁrms but also with the Chinese communities 
of Hong Kong, Singapore, China and Taiwan (Hamilton and Waters 
1997: 273-74). This new group no longer needed the patronage of the 
Thai elite or royalty to survive in Thailand as their rapid expansion 
was funded through 'the development of a web of alliances among 
internationally oriented capitalists, usually from overseas Chinese com-
munities' (Hamilton and Waters 1997: 275). The best examples of this 
new brand of Thai-Chinese capitalists are the Charoen Pokphand and 
the Sahapathanapibul groups.
Reynolds (1998: 121) says that despite the anti-Chinese racist policies 
of the Thai state, Thai Chinese maintained a sense of lineage and afﬁlia-
tion with overseas Chinese in the diaspora that facilitated the expansion 
of Thai-Chinese business in East and Southeast Asia. Reynolds (1998: 
122) mentions how Thai publishers have capitalized on the popularity 
of the Thai translation of the famous Chinese story cycle Romance of 
the Three Kingdoms 'by harnessing episodes in a new genre of business 
manuals, How to do business successfully by reading Romance of the Three 
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Kingdoms.' Thus Chinese popular culture has become successfully 
translated and incorporated into Thai business culture. Thus, instead 
of 'Chinese' disappearing into 'Thai', globalization has in effect limited 
the extent of Thai assimilationist policies (ibid.).
Chinese existence in Thailand shows a proactive view in the sense 
that the theoretical interest lies in acknowledging the individuals and 
the group making the best of the situation, not as mere victims of social 
forces (Chan and Tong 1993: 165).
The Chinese have managed to successfully integrate into Thai society 
while avoiding complete assimilation because they are recognized as 
making the best businessmen in Thailand and in effect contributing to 
the growth of the Thai economy. In fact, the entire capital city of Bangkok 
was essentially built on Chinese business money. At the same time, there 
is an awareness among Chinese businessmen that in order to succeed 
in Thailand, they have to cooperate with the Thai elites who control the 
political, military and administrative arenas, but lack the economic basis 
to bolster their political and military powers. Thus alliances are made 
between the Thai elites and Chinese businessmen, a complementary 
relationship that serves the interests of both groups (Chan and Tong 
1993: 156). 
One important difference between the Thai Chinese and the Thai Malay 
is the fact that the Chinese have found a niche for themselves in Thailand 
within a more secular space of business. While the Chinese are Buddhists 
as well, it is important to note that their practices of Mahayana Buddhism 
has seeped into the Theravada practices of the Thai. The vegetarian 
festival that is celebrated in different provinces in Thailand each year is 
testimony to this. It reveals, in a sense, the plasticity of Thai society to 
absorb practices that it views as nonthreatening. In the case of the Malay 
though, Islam and ethnicity have been promoted as the main features of 
Malay identity. Unlike the commercial interests of the Chinese, which 
have both beneﬁted Thai society and at the same time has not displaced 
local Thais from entering the business world with success, Islam and 
Malay identity in the south serve to not only exclude Thai Buddhists but 
also threaten the sovereignty of the Thai nation-state. Such threats are 
not to be entertained; they are to be reacted to harshly.14 
Conclusion
Can the Malay-speaking Muslims of Thailand, who by contrast to the 
Chinese are a very poor community and more so have resorted to vio-
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lence and hence have posed the most severe threat to Thailand, repeat 
the success of the Chinese?
Nation-states are especially fearful of threats to their sovereignty. And 
the Thai nation-state is a special case in point. The history of the Thai 
nation-state is one founded upon fear, writes Thongchai Winichakul 
in his magnum opus Siam Mapped (1994). Though never formally colo-
nized, the physical geo-body of Thailand was carved up and created by 
the colonial powers of France and Britain that ruled Vietnam and Laos, 
and Burma and Malaya respectively. While this reduced the land area 
of Thailand to its south, east and west, Thailand began to fear losing 
further territory to the newly formed communist states of Vietnam, Laos 
and Cambodia and the Malay-Muslim separatist agitation in the south. 
Anthropologist Andrew Cornish (1997: 8)15 gives one ethnographic ac-
count of this fear as portrayed in an army concert in the southern Thai 
Malay-Muslim province of Yala.
The concert was a mixture of light comedy and popular songs, but had a 
serious ﬁnale in which the performers depicted Thai history in front of a 
large map of Thailand. The map at ﬁrst showed the borders of Thailand 
extending over much of Southeast Asia, but as the narrator spoke actors in 
various foreign costumes strode onto the stage to steal successive pieces of the 
map and run away with them. The narrator explained how the Thais were a 
people constantly under threat, who needed to be constantly vigilant against 
attempts to steal their territory. One of the stolen segments comprised the 
whole of present-day peninsular Malaysia, and the southern border region 
where Yala is located was speciﬁcally indicated as one of those areas still 
under threat.
With the demise of hard-core communist ideology in the northern 
Southeast Asian countries of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, the only 
challenge that Thailand faces to its physical borders and national sov-
ereignty today comes from the Malay Muslims of southern Thailand. A 
people who have suffered the consequences of Thailand's assimilationist 
and integrationist policies, today's Thai Malays are being confronted 
with a crisis in Malay identity (Jory 2007: 19-20). Hence their greater 
appeal to Islam, which gives them a more secure sense of identity in a 
Thailand that allows space for Muslim identity (since there are Thai-
speaking Muslims all over Thailand who have not posed a security 
threat and in fact live peacefully as Thais and as Muslims, an ideal that 
the Thai state strongly supports) but not Malay identity, which is seen 
as an Other and hence not being able to assimilate into Thai-ness (Fraser 
1966: 89). And the current resistance, which has taken on an Islamic tone 
but has no clearly articulated objectives, is perhaps a symptom of the 
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confused ideology of the movement in the midst of the void left by the 
obliteration of Patani Malay identity,' writes historian of Thai society 
Patrick Jory (2007: 20). If the destruction of Patani Malay identity by 
the Thai state is the result of a rootless new generation of Patani Malay 
youth currently lashing out violently at the Thai state, then does the 
future spell doom for the southern Thai Malay-Muslims?
Perhaps it is pertinent to end with hope with a quote from historian 
of Thai society, Craig Reynolds (2005: 36), 'Nation is forever in the act 
of construction. It is a building that will never be ﬁnished.' And within 
that unﬁnished space, perhaps the Thai Malays will be able to carve 
out a space for their peaceful existence as Thais and as Malays and as 
Muslims.
Saroja Dorairajoo is an Assistant Professor in Anthropology at the Chinese 
University of Hong Kong (sarojadorairajoo@cuhk.edu.hk).
NOTES
1  I would like to thank the two anonymous reviewers of an earlier version of this 
paper. I have tried to incorporate their comments and suggestions to the best of my 
ability. Nevertheless, any ﬂaws in the paper are wholly mine. 
2  Violence associated with the Muslim insurgency has also been reported in the Ma-
lay-Muslim-dominated districts of the province of Songkhla bordering Pattani.
3  The status of Muslims in Thailand has become highly political in that even the 
population ﬁgure for the Muslims in Thailand is a contested issue. Ofﬁcial reports 
have often given a conservative estimate of four percent (Omar 1992: 1). Scholars 
have, however, given higher ﬁgures for the Muslim population ranging from six 
percent (Scupin 1998: 229) to eight percent (Gilquin 2005). Omar (1992: 2) says that 
the 1977 ﬁgure given by the Central Committee for Islamic Affairs of Thailand is 
ten percent. The fact that the 'ofﬁcial' Muslim ﬁgure in Thailand is highly contro-
versial shows the differences in attitude of each group toward the other. While the 
state would want to see a lower ﬁgure for the Muslim population of Thailand, the 
Muslims themselves feel that they are being misrepresented in Thailand. 
4  These categories are self-deﬁned, state-deﬁned and academically deﬁned. See works 
by Omar (1992), Scupin (1998) and the various articles in the edited volume by Forbes 
(1989).
5  Food and dress are seen as principal cultural markers. While Thai Malays are in-
creasingly consuming halal Thai food, especially in the small diners and restaurants, 
Malay food is cooked at home and sold in the village coffee shops. Thai Buddhists, 
for example, recognize roti, various versions of a ﬂatbread made of wheat with 
origins in Malaysia and Saudi Arabia, as typical Muslim food. Another typically 
considered Muslim dish is kaeng matsaman or 'Mussalman curry'. A distinguishing 
ingredient in this curry is the use of ground roasted nuts, which is seen as a Malay 
feature. So, we can see how, in this instance, Thai Buddhists themselves make little 
distinction between Malays and Muslims and conﬂate the two categories. 
6  Islam is seen as an intrinsic part of Malay identity in these areas. My Thai Malay 
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informants often conﬂated the two identities as if they were one. In fact, the term 
used to describe Malays in the local Malay dialect, nayu, is often used to describe 
Muslims as well. Thus a Muslim from Singapore will be referred to as nayu singa-
pore while a Thai-speaking Muslim from Bangkok would be referred to as nayu 
bakok. Another important observation of the conﬂation of these two identities is the 
presence of many Arabic-derived words in the Malay language and the extensive 
use of Jawi, an Arabic-derived script, to write Malay in southern Thailand. In this, 
southern Thailand presents a unique contrast to the Malay communities of Malaysia, 
Indonesia, Singapore and Brunei, which use the Roman alphabet to write Malay. 
Southern Thailand can then be called the last bastion of the Jawi script in Southeast 
Asia where it is still seen as the proper script for writing the Malay language. 
7  As argued by several scholars including Duncan McCargo (2008: xi), there were 
already militant attacks on security forces in the southern border provinces since 
December 2001. The violent incident of 2 January 2004 is seen as ushering in a new 
era in the story of southern violence, not merely because of the attack on the military 
(which had happened in the past), but because the militants effectively overpowered 
and outwitted the military and escaped with hundreds of military weapons. This 
event represented a great shame to the strength of the Thai military and by exten-
sion the Thai state and brought to the fore that the state was dealing with more 
sophisticated militants than the previously dismissed bandits and petty criminals.
8  On National Day 1939, the name of Thailand was changed from Prathet Sayam to 
Prathet Thai in Thai and from Siam to Thailand in English (Barme 1992: 147).
9  This meaning of Thailand was oft referred to by the nationalist King Vajiravudh or 
Rama VI (r. 1910-1925). The clearest reference to this was in an essay he wrote in 
1911 in which he referred to the Thais as brave people not afraid of dying to maintain 
Thai freedom. 'We were born in the Thai race, we are born free [Thai], we must die 
free [Thai]; if we become slaves, we will no longer be Thai [free]' (Vella 1978: 91).
10  The Thai nationalist Luang Wichit Wathakan was an important ﬁgure connected 
with the name change. He claimed that the name Siam was invented by the Angkor 
rulers from whom the Chinese and later the Europeans adopted the name (Stowe 
1991:122). Having obtained a map produced by the Ecole Francaise d’Extreme Ori-
ent which showed areas in the Indochinese peninsula, Southern China, Burma and 
Assam inhabited by the 'Thai race', Wichit argued for the name change saying that 
Siam bore no relation to the Thai people. Further Siam meant 'black' or 'dark' and so 
it was an inappropriate name for the Thai people who were a yellow-skinned race 
(Barme 1992: 148). Wichit also opined that all Thais, wherever they were, considered 
themselves independent since Thai meant 'slaves to none' (Barme 1992: 149).  
11  Malay belongs to the Austronesian language family, whose languages span halfway 
around the globe. In Southeast Asia, Austronesian languages including Malay and 
Tagalog are spoken in island Southeast Asia including Malaysia, Indonesia, Brunei 
and the Philippines. 
12  Singapore is a classic example where as an 'Indian', I am supposed to speak Tamil 
and be a Hindu!
13  In September 2005 in the village of Tanyong Limo in Narathiwat province, women 
and children blockaded a village where two marines had been taken hostage after 
the mysterious fatal shooting of two villagers in a teashop. As a result, security 
forces could not enter the village while the two marines were bludgeoned to death 
(Duncan 2008: 113). On 4 January 2007, women demonstrators in front of a police 
station in Pattani where a murder suspect was being held forced the police to release 
the suspect (Duncan 2008: 166-67).
14  I thank one of the reviewers of this paper for highlighting this point to me and I 
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have taken the liberty of working the reviewer's comment into my argument. 
15  Andrew Cornish Whose Place is This?: Malay Rubber Producers and Thai Government 
Ofﬁcials in Yala. Bangkok: White Lotus Press (Studies in Contemporary Thailand 
No. 5) 1997.
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